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George J. Rocktashel 
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Williamsport, PA   17701 
          Counsel for Appellee 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
sentencing Thomas Smith to 171 months’ imprisonment for 
carjacking, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 
and possessing a stolen firearm.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm.  
 
I.  Background 
 
 Around noon on August 8, 2012, Smith pulled his car 
off to the side of a road in Emporium, Pennsylvania, 
pretending that it was disabled.  He flagged down the 
manager of the local Citizens & Northern Bank, Kimberlea 
Whiting, who was driving home from the bank for lunch in 
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her Ford Explorer.  Smith asked her for a ride to an 
automobile repair shop, and she obliged.  As it turned out, 
Smith had been waiting for Whiting.  He wanted revenge 
because Citizens & Northern Bank had initiated foreclosure 
proceedings on the house he shared with his girlfriend.  After 
a conversation concerning the foreclosure, Smith drew a gun, 
which police later determined he stole from his brother-in-
law, and directed Whiting to drive to the bank, saying that she 
and another bank employee were now “going to pay for” 
taking his house.  (PSR ¶ 7.)  At first, Whiting thought Smith 
was joking – she even reached for his gun –  but he insisted 
he was serious.     
 
Once at the bank, Smith directed Whiting to drive to 
the rear parking lot; however, Whiting continued past the lot 
because she feared he would shoot and kill her there.  Smith 
instructed her to turn around, but, playing for time, Whiting 
stopped for other vehicles and waited for an opportunity to 
escape.  “As she approached a convenience store, [she] 
slowed down, unfastened her seat belt, and rolled [out of the 
car] onto the street” without serious injury.  (PSR ¶ 8.)  Smith 
abandoned the car after it came safely to a stop close to the 
convenience store.  While fleeing on foot, he also hid the gun 
beside a nearby creek.  He remained a fugitive until his arrest 
a month later.   
 
Following certain proceedings not relevant here, a 
federal grand jury returned a three-count second superseding 
indictment against Smith, charging him with carjacking, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; brandishing a firearm during a 
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii);
1
 and possessing a stolen firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).  Smith pleaded not guilty and 
went to trial.  The jury convicted him on all counts.   
 
The U.S. Probation Office issued a Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”) that set forth Smith’s 
recommended Sentencing Guidelines range.  His base offense 
level was 20, calculated from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2B3.1, for carjacking, which was his 
most serious offense for purposes of grouping his crimes and 
establishing a sentencing range, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a) 
(advising that, for groups of closely related crimes, “the 
highest offense level of the counts in the Group” applies).  
The PSR also included in the calculation four enhancements, 
producing a total offense level of 29.  First, the PSR added 
two points for bodily injury sustained by a victim, under 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A).  Second, it added four points for 
the victim’s abduction, under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).  Third, it 
added two points for carjacking, under § 2B3.1(b)(5).  And 
fourth, it added one point for the victim’s loss, i.e., the value 
of Whiting’s Ford Explorer ($26,750), under 
§ 2B3.1(b)(7)(B).  Combined with Smith’s criminal history 
category of I, the total offense level recommended by the PSR 
provided a sentencing range of 171-192 months’ 
imprisonment, including a mandatory, consecutive sentence 
                                              
1
 What appears to be a typographical error in the 
second superseding indictment mistakenly attributes the 
brandishing violation to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which 
penalizes the discharge of a firearm.  The error is of no 
moment, however, because the text of the indictment clearly 
sets forth, and the parties clearly understood, brandishing to 
be the charged conduct. 
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of 84 months’ imprisonment for brandishing a weapon during 
a crime of violence.   
 
Before and during the sentencing hearing on 
November 1, 2013, Smith objected to the offense-level 
enhancements based on bodily injury, abduction, and loss.  
The District Court sustained the objection to the bodily-injury 
enhancement but rejected the remaining two objections.  In 
overruling the objection to the abduction enhancement, the 
Court relied on our opinion in United States v. Reynos, 680 
F.3d 283, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2012).  After reviewing the record, 
the Court concluded that Smith’s actions rose to the level of 
abduction because (1) he pointed a gun at Whiting, thus 
showing that she was “not free to refuse [his] commands”; (2) 
he “forced … Whiting to move from her original location by 
directing the car’s whereabouts in Emporium”; and (3) 
although Whiting disobeyed him by not entering the bank 
parking lot, that daring disobedience did not indicate that she 
felt fully free to refuse his commands, and, in fact, she 
escaped while still complying with his command to “keep 
moving.”  (App. at 651-52.)   
 
Then, in overruling the loss objection, the Court found 
persuasive our non-precedential decision in United States v. 
Grey, in which we held that a vehicle was “taken” for 
purposes of loss under § 2B3.1 when an offender exercises 
temporary dominion and control over it and its contents.  369 
F. App’x 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Court determined that, 
although Smith abandoned the undamaged vehicle shortly 
after Whiting escaped, his armed commandeering of the car 
qualified for the enhancement.    
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After resolving Smith’s objections, the District Court 
calculated a total offense level of 27, which, combined with a 
criminal history category of I, resulted in a recommended 
sentencing range of 154-171 months’ imprisonment on the 
carjacking and stolen weapon counts, including the above-
mentioned mandatory, consecutive sentence of 84 months’ 
imprisonment on the brandishing count.  After reviewing the 
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court 
noted that “the seriousness of this offense and the fact that it 
is not a mine-run carjacking but was intended to result in 
some sort of twisted retribution for foreclosure proceedings 
calls for a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range.”  
(App. at 673.)  It then imposed a sentence at the top of the 
recommended range: 171 months’ imprisonment (87 months 
each on carjacking and possession of a stolen weapon to be 
served concurrently, along with the mandatory 84 months for 
brandishing), $300 in special assessments, and a three-year 
term of supervised release.  Smith timely appealed the 
judgment of conviction and sentence.   
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II.  Discussion
2
 
 
 Smith argues that his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable because the District Court miscalculated his 
total offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.  More 
specifically, he claims the Court committed two procedural 
errors: first, it wrongly concluded his crimes qualify for the 
enhancement for abduction, and, second, because Whiting’s 
car was not “taken, damaged, or destroyed,” as those terms 
are used in § 2B3.1 of the Guidelines, the Court wrongly 
applied the loss enhancement.  We address each of those 
arguments in turn. 
 
 A.  Application of the Abduction Enhancement 
 
Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual provides that, “[i]f any person was 
abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to 
facilitate escape,” the defendant’s offense level is to be 
increased by four points. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
“‘Abducted’ means that a victim was forced to accompany an 
offender to a different location.  For example, a bank robber’s 
                                              
 
2
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “When reviewing the sentencing decisions of 
the district courts, we exercise plenary review over legal 
questions about the meaning of the [S]entencing [G]uidelines, 
but apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard to factual 
determinations underlying their application.” United States v. 
Reynos, 680 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would 
constitute an abduction.”  Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(A).  In Reynos, 
we described three predicates for applying the enhancement:  
 
First, the robbery victims must be forced to 
move from their original position; such force 
being sufficient to permit a reasonable person 
an inference that he or she is not at liberty to 
refuse.  Second, the victims must accompany 
the offender to that new location.  Third, the 
relocation of the robbery victims must have 
been to further either the commission of the 
crime or the offender’s escape. 
 
680 F.3d at 286-87.   
 
The pertinent facts of Reynos were these: while 
robbing a pizza shop, the defendant kicked in a locked 
bathroom door, brandished a weapon, and forced an 
employee to accompany him to a cash register 34 feet away.  
Id. at 285, 290.  We concluded that the defendant’s purpose in 
forcing the employee’s movement was to facilitate the 
commission of a robbery by compelling that employee to 
provide the defendant with access to the cash register.  Id. at 
289.  We further held that the distance of over thirty feet was 
enough for the action to qualify as abduction under the 
Guidelines.  Id. at 291. 
 
 Although the carjacking here presents different 
circumstances than those at issue in Reynos – in particular, 
Whiting disregarded some of Smith’s commands and 
ultimately escaped – we agree with the District Court that 
Smith’s actions satisfy the Reynos predicates for finding that 
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an abduction occurred.  First, Smith used force to control both 
Whiting and her vehicle.  He pointed a gun at her and directed 
her to drive to the bank after tricking her into providing him 
entry into her vehicle.  In Reynos, we had “no hesitation in 
concluding that the brandishing of a weapon is a use of force 
for purposes of the abduction enhancement.”  Id. at 288.  
Smith’s use of a gun would certainly have caused any 
reasonable person to believe that he or she was not at liberty 
to refuse orders.   
 
 Second, Smith forced Whiting to accompany him to a 
new location.  While holding her at gunpoint, he ordered her 
to the bank parking lot.  Smith’s argument that Whiting 
disobeyed his orders by stopping at stop signs and do-not-
enter signs, as well as by yielding to other cars, is of no 
moment.  Whiting drove back to the bank instead of to her 
intended destination, her home, because Smith ordered her to 
do so at gunpoint.   
 
 And third, Smith forced Whiting to return to the bank 
to facilitate his threatened revenge for the foreclosure on his 
home.  Whether he intended to physically harm her or rob her 
or make her “pay” in some other way is unclear from the 
record; what is clear is that he intended to commit a crime 
that would have been impossible without her presence.  In 
fact, Whiting’s stated motivation for escape gives a 
contemporaneous view of events and buttresses the District 
Court’s application of the abduction enhancement: she said 
she fled because “I was not about to pull into the back of a 
building where there was nobody around and allow him to 
shoot me there.”  (App. at 283.)   
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 An important fact that distinguishes this case from 
Reynos is that Smith ultimately failed in his criminal plan – 
the carjacking was only a means to an intended but unrealized 
crime of revenge against Whiting and her co-worker.  
Another difference is that Whiting disregarded some of 
Smith’s orders, which may suggest that she felt, to some 
degree, “at liberty to refuse.”  Smith naturally tries to use to 
his advantage those distinctions from the facts in Reynos.  He 
invites us to fashion an exception to the abduction 
enhancement for when a victim struggles with the offender to 
the point that he or she thwarts the intended criminal 
objective.  We decline that invitation, as it is based on the 
perverse logic that a victim’s boldness lessens a criminal’s 
culpability.  Reynos provides for an objective, not subjective, 
standard in determining whether use of force was sufficient to 
satisfy the first predicate.  Thus, whether or not a victim 
struggles or disobeys orders, as long as a reasonable person 
would not have felt free to refuse the offender’s commands, 
the predicate is satisfied.  And, to the extent that it was not 
plain from our decision in Reynos, we now explicitly hold 
that the intended crime need not be accomplished for the 
abduction enhancement to apply.  The trial record fully 
supports the District Court’s finding that Smith abducted 
Whiting.  We therefore conclude that Smith’s sentence was 
not the result of any procedural error in applying the 
abduction enhancement.   
 
 11 
 
 B.  Application of the Loss Enhancement 
 
 Application Note 3 in the Commentary to Section 
2B3.1 defines “loss” for purposes of robbery3 as “the value of 
the property taken, damaged, or destroyed.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B3.1 cmt. n.3.  A one-point sentencing enhancement 
applies if the value of the loss is more than $10,000 but less 
than $50,000.  Id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B).  The parties agree that 
the value of Whiting’s Ford Explorer was $26,750.  The 
District Court found that, although Smith did not damage or 
destroy the vehicle, he “took” it when he commandeered it in 
furtherance of his ultimate goal of retribution.  Although 
Smith was only a temporary passenger in the vehicle, as 
mentioned above, the Court looked to our non-precedential 
opinion in Grey, in which we stated that a robber “takes” an 
object for purposes of § 2B3.1 when he exercises “dominion 
and control” over it, even when he does so only temporarily.4  
369 F. App’x at 333-34.  The Court accordingly applied the 
enhancement over Smith’s objection. 
                                              
 
3
 Chapter 103 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 
titled "Robbery and Burglary,” delineates carjacking as a 
form of robbery, such that the robbery guidelines are 
applicable here.  18 U.S.C. § 2119; U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5) & 
cmt. n.1; see also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 
(1999) (“The carjacking statute essentially is aimed at 
providing a federal penalty for a particular type of robbery.”).   
4
 We recognize that, as a general rule, we do not cite 
non-precedential opinions.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 553 
F.3d 724, 728 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedure 5.7 (indicating that non-
precedential “opinions are not regarded as precedents that 
bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court 
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 We agree with that decision and adopt the rule stated 
in Grey that temporary takings of property may justify 
application of the loss enhancement.  This is in accord with 
opinions from several of our sister courts of appeals.  See 
United States v. Allen, 516 F.3d 364, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(including property over which the defendant exercised only 
temporary dominion and control in loss analysis); United 
States v. Cruz-Santiago, 12 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); 
United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(same).  As then-Chief Judge Stephen Breyer, writing for the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cruz-Santiago, 
explained, “the Guidelines do not limit the Commentary’s 
word ‘taken’ to circumstances involving a ‘permanent’ 
deprivation of property.”  12 F.3d at 3.   
 
 On the record before it, the District Court properly 
applied the loss enhancement because Smith exercised 
dominion and control, albeit temporarily, over the vehicle 
when he coerced Whiting, against her will and at gunpoint, to 
drive to the bank.  Whiting’s later escape did not erase that 
taking.  Smith himself seems to acknowledge that reality, 
given his approval of the jury instructions on carjacking.  
Those instructions provided that “[t]o take a motor vehicle 
means to acquire possession or control of the vehicle for a 
period of time.  The government does not have to prove that 
the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of 
possession of the vehicle.”  (App. at 627.)  Relying on those 
instructions, the jury convicted Smith of carjacking.  The 
jury’s finding thus undermines Smith’s contention that he 
“never exercised dominion and control over the Ford 
                                                                                                     
before filing”).  We cite Grey here to summarize the 
foundation of the District Court’s reasoning.   
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Explorer.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 19.)  There was 
ample basis in the record to support the District Court’s 
determination that Smith “took” Whiting’s vehicle, and the 
application of the loss enhancement in § 2B3.1(b)(7)(A) was 
procedurally sound.               
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence.     
